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This paper investigates the relationship between different classes of institutional investors 
and firm performance. Using industry level data from Finland, which is characterized by 
various institutional investors who own multiple ownership stakes in different firms 
across a broad spectrum of industries, the paper exhibits two novelties. First, unlike 
previous studies which treated institutional investors as a monolithic group, we segment 
them in classes. Second, we recognize the joint determination of firm performance and 
institutional ownership. We account for this issue in the context of a system of equations, 
using three stage least squares methodology. The empirical results suggest a significant 
two-way feedback between firm performance and institutional equity ownership. 
However, this effect is not symmetric. We find that institutional investors with likely 
investment and business ties with firms have adverse (negative) effect on firm 
performance and the impact is very significant in comparison to the negative effect of 
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  11. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance in Finland. Prior studies examining this relationship in different countries 
(mainly OECD countries) have produced mixed results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) 
and Lowenstein (1991), for instance, find little evidence that institutional ownership is 
correlated with firm performance. McConnell and Servaes (1990), on the other hand, 
report that there is a positive relation between firm value and ownership by institutional 
investors. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005) study does not find a consistent relationship 
across countries. They conclude that their inconsistent results may reflect the fact that the 
influence of institutional investors on firm performance is location specific.
1 The above 
studies generally consider institutional investors as a monolithic group. However, 
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1986) as well as Pound’s (1988) theorizations and later empirical 
examinations by McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that shareholders are 
differentiable and pursue different agendas. Jensen and Merkling (1976) also show that 
equity ownerships by different groups have different effects on the firm performance. 
Therefore, it is important to explore the effect of segmented institutional investors on 
firm value. 
 
Pound (1988) explores the influence of institutional ownerships on firm 
performance and proposes three hypotheses on the relation between institutional 
shareholders and firm performance: efficient-monitoring hypothesis, conflict-of-interest 
hypothesis, and strategic-alignment hypothesis. The efficient-monitoring hypothesis says 
that institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at lower 
cost than can small atomistic shareholders. Consequently, this argument predicts a 
positive relationship between institutional shareholding and firm performance. This 
proposition implicitly assumes only an investment relationship between institutional 
shareholding and the firm. The conflict-of-interest proposition suggests that in view of 
                                                 
1 Other studies, e.g., Barclay and Holderness (1990) and Mikkelson and Ruback (1985, 1991) find that 
institutions can force value maximization in firms. Baysinger and Butler (1985), Jarrell and Lehn (1985) 
and Hansen and Hill (1991) also find that the level of institutional ownership is associated with increases in 
research and development expenditures by managers. 
  2other profitable business relationships with the firm, institutional investors are coerced 
into voting their shares with management. For instance, an insurance company may hold 
a significant portion of a firm’s stock and concurrently act as its primary insurer. Voting 
against management may significantly affect the firm’s business relationship with the 
incumbent management (and perhaps others as well), whereas voting with the 
management results in no obvious penalty. The strategic-alignment hypothesis states that 
institutional owners and managers find it mutually advantageous to cooperate. Generally, 
cooperation reduces the beneficial effects on the firm value that could result from 
monitoring by large shareholders. Consequently, the conflict-of-interest hypothesis and 
the strategic-alignment hypothesis both predict a negative relation between institutional 
ownership and the value of the firm. Heard and Sherman (1987) also argue that the dual 
activities of investment and business relationships could create a conflict of interest for 
these institutions. That is, for these institutions, the power gained from their ownership 
stake may be tampered somewhat by their reliance on the firm for business activity. 
 
Firm performance may, however, also affect ownership stakes. This leads to a 
two-way causality or endogeneity problem, where, ownership affects performance and 
vice versa. This is especially interesting within the context of Finland where equity 
ownership is concentrated and rests with multiple institutional investors. Earlier studies 
like Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Loderer and Martin (1997), Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1988), Cho (1998) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) consider the 
possible endogeneity concern between ownership structure and firm performance and 
address the endogeneity issue using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework. 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), however, point out that stronger evidence is needed to 
explore the endogeneity problem, particularly in the context of concentrated or diffused 
ownership structure. 
 
This study, therefore, provides additional evidence on the interaction between 
institutional ownership and firm performance using disaggregated institutional ownership 
dataset from Finland. We use an advanced empirical technique that provides a more 
robust way of exploring the endogeneity issue on the relationship between firm 
  3performance and institutional ownership. In doing so, this paper contributes to the 
empirical literature on ownership and performance in three main ways.  
First, distinct from previous studies, this paper employs the three-stage least 
squares (3SLS) estimation technique to investigate endogeneity between performance 
and ownership issue.
2 Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), as mentioned above, call for 
stronger evidence to explore the endogeneity issue. We suggest that the 3SLS would 
provide more robust evidence because, among other things, it captures cross-equation 
effects as error terms of individual equations in a system are assumed to be 
contemporaneously correlated. Also, the 3SLS estimation technique is more suitable for 
cross-sectional studies, where some of the institutional owners own multiple equity stakes 
in different firms across industries. As a result, ownership and performance issues can 
affect each other in various ways. These interactions can be captured well through 3SLS 
estimation technique. 
The second contribution of this study relates to the investigation of different 
dimensions of institutional ownership and their effect on firm performance. As noted 
above, prior studies have mostly considered institutional investors as a monolithic group. 
Using Pound’s (1988) hypotheses as a basis, Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) and 
Kochhar and David (1996), classify institutional ownership in two groups, pressure-
resistant and pressure-sensitive institutional investors. Pressure-resistant institutional 
investors are institutional investors that only have an investment relationships with firms 
in which they own equity. These include pension funds, mutual funds, endowments and 
foundations. On the other hand, pressure-sensitive institutional investors are likely to 
have both an investment and business relationships with firms in which they own an 
equity stake. These institutional shareholdings include equity holdings by insurance 
companies, banks, and non-bank trusts. Following this classification, we examine the 
effect of pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive institutional ownership on firm 
performance. Based on Pound’s (1988) conjectures, it is likely that there would be a 
negative relationship between pressure-sensitive institutional investors and firm 
performance because of the likely business relationship this class of institutional 
                                                 
2 Cho (1998) also employs 3SLS apart from 2SLS technique in his study. However, he only reports 2SLS 
estimation results as his findings from 3SLS remain qualitatively the same.   
  4investors have with firms in which they hold equity. The opposite should hold true for 
pressure-resistant institutional ownership. 
Thirdly, this paper explores institutional ownership and firm performance for 
different industries. It has been argued in the literature (see, for instance, Gilson and Roe 
(1993) and Roe (1994)) that factors that affect firm performance, ranging from the nature 
of the board’s role to the risk of bankruptcy, vary, among other things, by industry and 
country. Therefore, different industry and country studies provide further insights on 
relationship between ownership and firm performance. 
This study reports some very important findings. Considering all institutional 
investors where institutional owners control multiple equity stakes in different firms, the 
empirical results suggest a significant two-way feedback between firm performance and 
institutional equity ownership. The magnitudes of this two-way effect, however, differ in 
the sense that institutional ownership is more sensitive to the firm performance than the 
other way around. The empirical investigations also suggest that, as proposed by Pound 
(1988),  pressure-sensitive institutional ownership stakes adversely affects firm 
performance and the impact is very significant in comparison to the negative effect of 
firm performance on institutional ownership.  These findings remain robust when we 
estimate, separately, the equations in presence all individual industry-specific dummy 
variables as well as in presence of different institutional ownership-specific dummies. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In section two, we 
describe the data and descriptive statistics. Section three outlines the methodology. 
Section four contains results discussion. Section five concludes. All tables are provided in 
appendix 1. Appendix 2 summarizes data details. 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
In this study, firms are selected from publicly traded companies in Finland 
provided they satisfy two basic data requirements. First, for a firm to be included in the 
dataset, it is required that ownership data be available for the sample year, 2004. The 
ownership data used in this paper is collected from the respective firms’ 2004 annual 
  5reports. A further requirement is that firms included in the dataset must be included in the 
Thomson Financial Database. All performance related data is assessed from Thomson 
Financial Database.
3 The final sample consists of 116 firms. 
 
The overall sample includes 754 institutional ownership observations for the 116 
firms. Of these, 419 and 335 observations are deemed as pressure-sensitive and pressure-
resistant institutional shareholdings, respectively. Following Demsetz and Villalonga’s 
(2001), firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q (denoted by Tobin’s Q), which is 
defined as the sum of the year-end market value of common stocks and the book value of 
total debt divided by the book value of total assets. 
 
The firms in the dataset, among others, are partially owned by multiple 
institutional investors. We, therefore, calculate the Herfindahl index of equity ownership 
by institutional shareholders (denoted by Share
4) to help identify ownership 
concentration. The Herfindahl index is calculated as: 
 





ij j share Share
1
 
where,   is the share of institutional owner i in firm  ij share j . Large values of this index 
signify that the ownership is concentrated within a few large institutional owners and 
small values imply that many institutional owners share the ownership stake. The number 
of observations drops to 180 from initial 754 after calculating the Herfindahl index. It is 
interesting to note that even though there are 116 firms in the sample used here in this 
paper, we end up with 180 observations because of multiple ownerships and cross-
ownerships across industrial firms. We take care of possible estimation issues in this set-
up in our econometric methodology presented in the next section. We also separate the 
institutional ownership into two categories based on the nature of ownership: (I) shares 
owned by pressure-resistant owners (denoted by “_pr”) and (II) shares owned by 
                                                 
3 See Appendix 2 for detailed data related description. 
4 For clarity and ease of presentation, we drop the subscript   from in the rest of the paper.   j j Share
  6pressure-sensitive owners (denoted by “_ps”). Pressure resistant institutional owners 
include asset management entities (like pension funds) that only have an investment 
relationship with the firm. On the other hand, pressure sensitive institutional investors 
include insurance companies and banks. Pound’s (1988) hypothesis suggests that these 
firms are likely to have both an investment and business relationship with the firm in 
which they own equity stakes. 
 
To address endogeneity or two way causality problem between performance and 
ownership, we use return on equity (denoted by ROE) as an alternative measure of 
performance.  ROE is used as an instrument for firm performance in the empirical 
estimation later. Herfindahl index of ownership based on owners voting rights 
(proportion of decisive votes with the stakeholders), denoted by Vote in appendix tables, 
is used as an alternative measure of ownership. Vote is used as a plausible instrument for 
Share. Sales growth (denoted by Salesg) is used as an additional explanatory variable.
5 
Higher sales growth may have a positive effect on the value of the firm, attracting 
additional ownership stakes. In regressing performance on ownership, cash flow (divided 
by total assets and denoted by Cashf) is added as another explanatory variable. Cash flow 
deflated by total assets is used as a proxy for liquidity
6. 
 
In accordance with the existing literature, we investigate the firm performance 
and ownership feedbacks on each other using four control variables: 
(1)  Leverage  (denoted by Levg): Stultz (1988) theorizes that high (insider) 
ownership may increase leverage. This happens because owners with substantial controls 
may increase debt as a proportion of equity to maintain their ownership stakes. On the 
other hand, pecking order theory suggests a negative relationship between various 
measures of firm performance and leverage. To reconcile the two contradicting views, we 
use this control variable, which is measured as the ratio of total debts to assets (debt-to-
                                                 
5 In Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), they employ logarithm of sales as a control for firm 
characteristic and not as an explanatory variable. 
6 Following Seifert et al. (2005), we use 3-year averages for the control and explanatory variables to reduce 
the noise associated with figures based on just a year of data. 
  7equity ratio). Anderson and Reeb (2003) also control for debt in the capital structure in 
this way.  
(2) Capital expenditure (denoted by Kexp): Capital expenditures (scaled by total 
assets) can proxy for investment and may positively affect firm performance (see, Jensen 
(1986, 1989)). This variable is included as a control variable to take into account the 
possible influence of investment on ownership, as mentioned in Short (1994). Thomsen, 
Pedersen and Kvist (2006), in a recent study, also throw light on this control variable. 
(3) Market risk (denoted by Mktrisk): This is measured by the standard deviation 
of monthly stock returns over the prior sixty months. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), using 
cross-sectional data for US, show that the level of (managerial) ownership is determined 
by the riskiness of the firm, measured by the volatility of the stock price. It is based on 
“moral hazard” type argument, which says that managers of riskier firms are more prone 
to face moral hazards. As a result, their ownership stakes would be greater to abet 
fluctuations in incentives. Whether the same kind of argument holds true for institutional 
ownership remains an interesting question, which is addressed in this paper as well. 
Andersen and Reeb (2003) also use the same control variable in their analysis.  
(4) Firm size (denoted by Ln(Size), after taking logarithm for scale adjustment): It 
has often been argued that size should be negatively related to ownership (see, for 
instance, Demsetz and Lehn (1985)) since it is harder to own the same percentage in a 
large firm as compared to a small firm. We measure firm size by book value of total 
assets. In their study, Anderson and Reeb (2003) also utilize the same measure for firm 
size. 
Additionally, the following nine industry-level dummies are also used for 
checking the industry-specific performance and ownership interactions: (1) information 
technology industry dummy (denoted by Ites), (2) industrials dummy (denoted by Inds), 
(3) consumer discretionary industry dummy (denoted by Cond), (4) consumer staples 
industry dummy (denoted by Stap), (5) materials industry dummy (denoted by Mate), (6) 
healthcare industry dummy (denoted by Heal), (7) real estate industry dummy (denoted 
by  Rest), (8) telecommunication industry dummy (denoted by Tele) and (9) utilities 
industry dummy (denoted by Util). Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Demsetz and Lehn 
  8(1985) and Cho (1998) also employ industry-specific dummies (utility industry, media 
industry and financial industry) in their studies.  
 
In Tables 1, 2 and 3 of appendix 1, we present the descriptive statistics of the 
dependent and independent variables (performance (Tobin’s Q) and ownership (Share)), 
their instruments (ROE and Vote), control variables (Levg, Kexp, Mktrisk, and Size) and 
exogenous variables (Cashf and Salesg) for all types of institutional owners. From these 
three tables, performance measured by Tobin’s Q and the alternative measure of 
performance, return on equity (ROE), show consistent results in terms of their sample 
moment statistics. The average value of firm performance for all institutional owners 
(1.154) is in line with the existing studies. For instance, Cho reports Tobin’s q of 1.100 in 
1990 for 326 Fortune 500 firms; Demsetz and Villalonga finds Tobin’s q to be 1.129 for 
223 US firms and Seifert et al. tabulate Tobin’s q of 1.286 for 319 German firms. It is 
interesting to note that, Herfindahl indexes for institutional ownership (Share) and voting 
rights (Vote) show that ownership is diffused across multiple firms for all types of 
institutional owners. In comparison to that, firm ownership seems to be concentrated for 
pressure sensitive institutional owners. 
 
Table 4 reports correlation results for all variables. Share and Vote show high 
correlation, which is expected between the original variable (in the case, Share) and the 
instrumental variable (in this case, Vote). Similarly, Tobin’s Q and ROE exhibit 
moderately high correlation. Negative correlations between two exogenous variables 
(Cashf and Salesg) and ownership stakes (Share) suggest that cash flow and sales growth 
may affect ownership in an adverse way. We find some support for our earlier conjecture 
regarding sales growth and firm performance (refer to the positive correlation between 
Salesg and Tobin’s Q), i.e., higher sales growth may have a positive effect on the value of 
the firm. Looking at the correlations between controls (Levg, Kexp, Mktrisk and Size) and 
firm performance (Tobin’s Q), we find a priori support for the pecking order theory, as 
Tobin’s Q and Levg are negatively correlated. Correlation results between ownership 
(Share) and the above controls show some support for market risk (Mktrisk) and 
ownership (Share) argument (positive) provided earlier.  
  93. Methodology 
 
In the setup adopted in this paper, there is a potential two-way causality or 
endogenous relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. As 
pointed out by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Cho (1998), a simple OLS estimation 
to investigate the relationship between the two variables would yield biased and 
inconsistent estimators. As such, a more sophisticated estimation technique is needed. 
Two ways, among others, to address the problem of biased and inconsistent estimators 
include the use of instrumental variable two stage least squares (2SLS) technique or  to 
employ instrumental variable three stage least squares (3SLS) technique. The main 
difference between 2SLS and 3SLS estimation technique is that 3SLS captures cross-
equation effects as error terms of individual equations in the system are assumed to be 
contemporaneously correlated under 3SLS. 
 
We propose that the 3SLS technique is more suitable for our cross-section dataset, 
as some of the institutional owners own multiple equity stakes in different firms. As a 
result, ownership and performance issues can affect each other in various ways. These 
interactions can be captured through 3SLS estimation technique. Under 3SLS setup, 
choice of instruments plays a very important role. Therefore, as in Bennedsen, Nielsen, 
Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon (2006), we make careful considerations on the choice of 
instruments when we estimate the performance and ownership relationships in the 
following way: 
 
) ( . . exp . . . ' 5 4 3 2 1 0 Size Ln Mktrisk K Levg Share sQ Tobin α α α α α α + + + + + =   
      1 6. ε α + + Cashf           ( 2 )  
) ( . . exp . . ' . 5 4 3 2 1 0 Size Ln Mktrisk K Levg sQ Tobin Share β β β β β β + + + + + =  
2 6. ε β + + Salesg           ( 3 )  
 
where, Tobin’s Q and Share are two dependent variables in this system of equations, 
showing possible two-way relationship as Share and Tobin’s Q also show up on the right 
  10hand sides of individual regression equations.  1 ε  and  2 ε  are error terms for individual 
equations (2) and (3), which are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated.
7 We take 
the return on equity (denoted by ROE) as a plausible instrument for firm performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q (denoted by Tobin’s Q). For ownership, we employ the 
Herfindahl index of proportion of decisive vote shares (denoted by Vote) controlled by 
institutional owners as an instrument for institutional owners equity stakes. Leverage 
(Levg), capital expenditure (Kexp), market risk (Mktrisk) and logarithm of firm size 
(Ln(Size)) are control variables in both equations. Cashf is the unique exogenous variable 
in equation (2) and Salesg is the unique exogenous variable in equation (3). This 
uniqueness is helpful to correctly identify the system (comprising of the above two 
equations, (2) and (3)) before estimation.
 8
 
To cross-check the validity of instruments chosen, first, we perform Hausman’s 
(1978) test for endogeneity by regressing and reporting the coefficient of the residuals in 
the second stage regression. These residuals are generated from the first stage regression 
when the endogenous variable is regressed on all possible instruments and exogenous 
variables. In all of the cases involving industry-specific dummies and without industry-
specific dummies, we find that Hausman test points to possible endogenous relationships 
with the chosen instruments working as correct proxies (see the first column in Table 5 of 
Appendix 1 for reference). Thereafter, we test whether the instruments are statistically 
relevant. Following the suggestion of Staiger and Stock (1997) as well as Hahn and 
Hausman (2002), we use the joint significance of F-test statistics when the endogenous 
variable is regressed on instrument and all other exogenous variables to measure 
relevance of those particular instruments. We report this as ‘Relevance’ in the second 
column of Table 5. In the third column of Table 5, we report one of the necessary 
conditions for choice of instruments, i.e., the correct instruments should be highly 
conditionally correlated with endogenous variables. We find that Vote is very highly 
                                                 
7 3SLS is appropriate if right-hand side variables are correlated with the error terms, and there is both 
heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation in the residuals. We have checked for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity test and contemporaneous correlation in the 
residuals using Breusch-Godfrey test before applying 3SLS technique. 
8 System identification entails checking and satisfying both the rank and order conditions (see, Hsiao 
(1983)). We have checked those and find that the system is correctly identified. 
  11correlated with Share. Similarly, ROE is also positively correlated with performance 
variable. Finally, we perform Sargan’s (1958) test for overidentifying restrictions in the 
instrumental variable estimation.
9 A check of the last column of Table 5, where we 
present these test results denoted by ‘Overidentification’ reveals one interesting fact. 
ROE and interactive terms of ROE as instruments met with the overidentification criteria. 
However, Vote and interactive terms of Vote show that all instruments are not orthogonal 
to the error. Therefore, we employ different sets of instruments involving Vote and 
interactive terms of Vote.  
 
The estimation results of these two equations are reported as M1 in the first two 
columns of Table 6 for all types of institutional owners. Additionally, we checked the 
robustness of estimated interaction between Tobin’s Q and Share in presence of industry-
specific dummies in the above two equations. The results of these 3SLS estimation are 
reported as M2 (includes utility industry dummy as in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)) and M3 (excluding utility industry dummy) in the last 
four columns of Table 6 for all types of institutional owners.  
 
Thereafter, we explore the robustness of institutional ownership-specific effects 
on the firm performance by estimating the following system of equations with ownership-
specific interactive dummies in the following way: 
 
3 12 11 10 9
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
_ * . . _ * ) ( . ) ( .                
_ * . . _ exp* . exp .                
_ * . . _ * . . '
ε γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ
+ + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + + =
pi dum Cashf Cashf pi dum Size Ln Size Ln
pi dum Mktrisk Mktrisk pi dum K K
pi dum Levg Levg pi dum Share Share sQ Tobin
(4) 
4 12 11 10 9
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
_ * . . _ * ) ( . ) ( .                
_ * . . _ exp* . exp .                
_ * . . _ * ' . ' .
ε δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
+ + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + + =
pi dum Salesg Salesg pi dum Size Ln Size Ln
pi dum Mktrisk Mktrisk pi dum K K
pi dum Levg Levg pi dum sQ Tobin sQ Tobin Share
        (5) 
                                                 
9 Sargan’s test statistic is a special case of Hansen’s (1982)  statistic, and it is distributed as a   






K  denotes the numbers of parameters. Without dummies, we have 21 degrees of freedom 
for the 
2
LK χ −  test statistic, which shows a critical value of 30.014 under 5% significance level. Note that 
we want to accept the null hypothesis in this case to obtain the desired result. 
  12where,  s or    r i = , depending on whether it is a pressure-resistant institutional owner 
(representation will be dum_pr) or a pressure-sensitive institutional owner (representation 
will be dum_ps). Analogous to the above system, Tobin’s Q and Share are two dependent 
variables in this system of equations, showing possible two-way relationship as Share 
and Tobin’s Q also show up on the right hand sides of individual regression equations. 
The i ε ’s are error terms for individual equations (4) and (5), which are assumed to be 
contemporaneously correlated. Non-interactive terms in equations (4) and (5) will show 
the effect of the other institutional ownership. For example, when we run the above 
system for pressure-resistant type institutional owners, then non-interactive terms will 
report the effect for pressure-sensitive type owners in the data sample. The results of 
these estimations are reported under M1 in the first two columns of Table 7 in the first 
Appendix.
10 We also estimate the above equation in presence of industry-specific 
dummies interacted with ownership-specific dummies to explore the robustness of the 
reported results. These findings are reported under M2 and M3 in the last four columns of 
Table 7 in the first Appendix. 
 
4. Results and discussions 
4.1 Overall results 
 
Table 6 shows results of the 3SLS estimation of systems identified in equations 
(2) and (3) for all types of institutional ownerships, after controlling for industry-specific 
dummies. We report three sets of results: (i) first set of results are denoted by M1, where, 
no industry-specific dummies are used; (ii) the second set of results are labeled as M2, 
where, utility industry dummy (as in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001)) and seven other industry-specific dummies are incorporated in the 
                                                 
10 We have also reported table 8 in the appendix where estimation results are reported for pressure sensitive 
type institutional owners. But as we have pointed out earlier, these two tables point to the same interactive 
results. 
  13estimation and (iii) the third set of results are termed as M3, where, except utility industry 
dummy, all other industry-specific dummies are employed in the estimation.
11  
 
Overall, the results point to the following important issues. First, for a cross-
section of firms and institutional owners in Finland, where institutional owners control 
multiple equity stakes in different firms, there is considerable two-way feedback between 
business performances and controlling equity stakes related decision making. On the one 
hand, we find that business performances, measured by Tobin’s Q, determine ownership 
stakes. On the other hand, ownership stakes considerably affect firm performance. 
Second, the magnitudes of the effects outlined above differ in the sense that ownership 
decisions are more sensitive to the business performance than the other way around. We 
find that ownership stakes adversely affects firm performance and the impact is very high 
(ranging around 2%) in comparison to the negative effect of firm performance on 
institutional ownership (hovering around 0.2%). Thirdly, the findings from the estimated 
equations are robust (remains negative and statistically significant) when we separately 
estimate the equations in presence of all individual industry-specific dummy variables as 
well as in presence of different institutional ownership-specific dummies.  
 
Looking at the results from all types of institutional owners related estimation 
from Table 6, we conclude that institutional ownership adversely affects firm 
performance after controlling for debt-to-equity ratio (through Levg), capital expenditure 
(through Kexp), market risk (through Mktrisk) and firm size (through Ln(Size)). We find 
that with multiple institutional ownerships across firms, the business performance is 
adversely affected by 2% after maintaining the same debt-to-equity ratio, capital 
expenditure, market risk and firm size. This effect is robust (remains negative, significant 
and of the same magnitude) in presence of industry-specific dummies. This is an 
important result and it can be aligned with the recent findings by Thomsen et al. (2006) 
for continental Europe, though their focus is on blockholder ownership. Additionally, our 
finding can be interpreted as supporting Fama and Jensen’s (1983) view that ownership 
                                                 
11 We have also estimated models with different sets of industries and the findings from those validate the 
robustness of performance and ownership results. These models are not reported here due to space 
constraint but the findings are always available from the corresponding author. 
  14adversely affects firm performance, though their result is suitable from blockholders 
perspective. It is interesting to note that our findings suggest that blockholders ownership 
and institutional ownership behave along the same line if we look at their impact on firm 
performance. 
 
On the other hand, our findings also show that firm performance is not a positive 
determinant for ownership stakes. Firm performance or business performance, measured 
by  Tobin’s Q negatively affects ownership decisions to the extent of 0.2%, after 
controlling for debt-to-equity ratio, capital expenditure, market risk and firm size. 
Loderer and Martin (1997) also report that Tobin’s Q is a negative predictor of insider 
ownership. Taken together, the above findings show significant two-way causality 
between firm performance and ownership, with institutional ownerships impact on firm 
performance being more pronounced.  
 
Looking at the controls, we find that firm size plays a positive role in determining 
ownership stakes for institutions, thus, supporting earlier findings from La Porta, Lopez 
de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000). This is not consistent, however, in presence of 
dummies, but becomes robust for pressure sensitive owners later (see table 7 for 
reference). We find strong support for pecking order theory, as leverage adversely affects 
firm performance, and remains robust in presence of industry dummies. As argued in 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) for managerial ownership context, we also find that market 
risk has a positive influence on institutional ownership for Finland. Within industries, 
only utilities industry exerts positive influence on equity ownership.  
 
4.2 Robustness check 
 
Tables 7 and 8 report robustness checks results with and pressure-sensitive 
institutional dummies interacted with performance and ownership measures, as outlined 
in equations (4) and (5) above. For non-interactive dummies, the results need to be 
interpreted in the following way. Tobin’s Q in Table 7, for instance, shows the 
  15performance impact from pressure-sensitive institutional owners as Tobin’s Q*dum_pr 
reflects firm performance for pressure-resistant owners.  
 
The robustness results from Table 7 clearly show support for Pound’s (1988) 
argument, that for pressure-sensitive institutional owners, ownership stakes adversely 
affects performance and the extent is around 2%. This is in line with recent evidence 
from continental Europe in Thomsen et al. (2006). This finding remains consistent (in 
terms of statistical significance and negative sign) in presence of industry-specific 
dummies as well. It is important to note that in presence of industry-specific dummies, 
this adverse effect becomes more pronounced with magnitudes ranging around -3%. 
Therefore, in presence of industry-specific attributes, pressure-sensitive institutional 
ownership stakes affect business performances in much more adverse ways. 
 
Similarly, for pressure-sensitive institutional owners, firm performance negatively 
affects (with the magnitude hovering around 0.2% to 0.3%) shareholding stakes, as in 
Loderer and Martin (1997). Therefore, considerable two way feedbacks exist between 
firm performance (Tobin’s Q) and institutional ownership (Share). These are consistent 
and robust for pressure-sensitive institutional investors.  
 
Considering the control variables, we find that firm size plays a positive role in 
determining ownership stakes for pressure-sensitive institutions, thus, supporting earlier 
findings from La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000). We also find some 
support for pecking order theory for pressure-sensitive institutional owners, as leverage 
adversely affects firm performance, and remains robust in presence of industry dummies 
involving utilities. Within industries, utilities industry exerts positive influence on equity 
ownership for pressure-sensitive institutional owners. 
 
Additional robustness checks in reported in Table 8 support earlier findings that 
institutional ownership stakes adversely affects performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, for 
pressure-resistant firms as well. Table 8 also reports one interesting finding involving 
firm performance and institutional ownership. It shows that firm performance has no 
  16influence on pressure-resistant institutional ownership stakes, which partially support the 
existing literatures (see, for instance, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Thomsen et al. 




This paper looks at a new dimension of ownership, viz., institutional ownership 
(as posited in Pound (1988)) and it’s interaction with firm performance for 116 firms 
across nine industries in Finland. Institutional ownership is separated between pressure-
sensitive  institutional owners (including insurance companies, banks, and non-bank 
trusts) and pressure-resistant owners (for instance, public pension funds, mutual funds, 
endowments and foundations). There is evidence that these institutional owners own 
stakes in multiple firms across industries, leading to a possible two way causality or 
endogeneity problem between firm performance and ownership structure. Three stage 
least squares (3SLS) is employed to address this problem for the first time in the 
literature. The choice of instruments in the 3SLS setup is carefully investigated. To 
explore firm performance and ownership issue in this framework, two exogenous 
variables (cash flow and sales growth) and four control variables (leverage, capital 
expenditure, market risk and firm size) are employed in accordance to the existing 
literature (see for example Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Anderson and Reeb (2003)). 
Additionally, nine industry specific dummies for information technology industry, 
industrials industry, consumer discretionary industry, consumer staples industry, 
materials industry, healthcare industry, real estate industry, telecommunications industry 
and utilities industry are also used to check for robust and consistency in the results.  
 
The results show that there is considerable two-way feedback between business 
performances and controlling equity stakes related decision making. The magnitudes of 
the effects outlined above differ in the sense that ownership decisions are more sensitive 
to the business performance than the other way around. We find that institutional 
ownership stakes adversely affects firm performance (as proposed in Pound (1988) for 
pressure-sensitive institutional owners) and the impact is very high in comparison to the 
  17negative effect of firm performance on institutional ownership. This result can be aligned 
with the recent findings by Thomsen et al. (2006) for continental Europe, though their 
focus is on blockholder ownership. Also, our finding can be interpreted as supporting 
Fama and Jensen’s (1983) view, albeit, from blockholders perspective. Findings from 
above remain robust when we separately estimate the equations in presence all individual 
industry-specific dummy variables as well as in presence of different institutional 
ownership-specific dummies. The results also show that, firm performance is not a 
positive determinant for institutional ownership stakes, as in Loderer and Martin’s (1997) 
result regarding insider ownership. Additional robustness checks show that firm 
performance has no influence on institutional ownership stakes, which partially support 
the existing literatures (see, for instance, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Thomsen et 
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  23Appendix 1: Tables 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for All Types of Institutional Owners 
 
Variables Mean  Median Standard 
deviation  Maximum Minimum Skewness  No. of 
obs. 
Tobin’s Q  1.154 0.958  0.740  4.526  0.117  2.407 180 
ROE  7.417 7.100 25.196 189.500 -57.000  3.824 180 
Share  0.017 0.002  0.055  0.366  0.000  5.000 180 
Vote  0.019 0.001  0.057  0.366  0.000  4.661 180 
Levg  0.240 0.244  0.165  0.630  0.000  0.266 180 
Kexp  8.240 6.008  9.620  72.472  0.320  4.384 180 
Mktrisk  0.033 0.029  0.017  0.133  0.016  2.888 180 
Size  1386.430 120.900  3883.102 22456.000  8.506  4.015 180 
Cashf  1.279 0.809  1.829  12.116  -0.288  3.549 180 
Salesg  0.071 0.025  0.213  1.576  -0.246  4.231 180 
Notes: Tobin’s Q measures firm performance; ROE stands for return on equity, which is an alternative measure for 
performance;  Share denotes the Herfindahl index of ownership shares by institutional shareholders; Vote is an 
alternative Herfindahl index of ownership based on owners voting rights; Levg denotes leverage; Kexp measures capital 
expenditure; Mktrisk stands for market risk measured as the standard deviation of  monthly stock returns for prior sixty 





Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Pressure Resistant Type Institutional Owners 
 
Variables Mean  Median Standard 
deviation  Maximum Minimum Skewness  No. of 
obs. 
Tobin’s Q  1.145 0.956  0.739  4.526  0.117  2.422  92 
ROE  6.818 7.050 25.475 189.500 -57.000  3.643  92 
Share  0.011 0.001  0.043  0.361  0.000  6.411  92 
Vote  0.014 0.001  0.048  0.361  0.000  5.338  92 
Levg  0.243 0.248  0.167  0.630  0.000  0.236  92 
Kexp  8.310 5.963  9.719  72.472  0.320  4.222  92 
Mktrisk  0.034 0.028  0.017  0.133  0.016  2.683  92 
Size  1355.001 119.027  3856.649 22456.000  8.506  4.065  92 
Cashf  1.225 0.818  1.818  12.116  -0.288  3.585  92 
Salesg  0.076 0.025  0.217  1.576  -0.246  3.883  92 
Notes: Tobin’s Q measures firm performance; ROE stands for return on equity, which is an alternative measure for 
performance;  Share denotes the Herfindahl index of ownership shares by institutional shareholders; Vote is an 
alternative Herfindahl index of ownership based on owners voting rights; Levg denotes leverage; Kexp measures capital 
expenditure; Mktrisk stands for market risk measured as the standard deviation of  monthly stock returns for prior sixty 






  24Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Pressure Sensitive Type Institutional Owners 
 
Variables Mean  Median Standard 
deviation  Maximum Minimum Skewness  No. of 
obs. 
Tobin’s Q  1.163 0.967  0.754  4.526  0.117  2.393  88 
ROE  8.042 7.450 25.031 189.500 -57.000  4.033  88 
Share  0.022 0.002  0.066  0.366  0.000  4.154  88 
Vote  0.022 0.002  0.066  0.366  0.000  4.110  88 
Levg  0.239 0.241  0.163  0.630  0.000  0.299  88 
Kexp  8.166 6.067  9.570  72.472  0.320  4.561  88 
Mktrisk  0.032 0.028  0.016  0.133  0.016  3.143  88 
Size  1419.288 127.924  3932.404 22456.000  11.918  3.964  88 
Cashf  1.303 0.889  1.850  12.116  -0.240  3.514  88 
Salesg  0.066 0.025  0.211  1.576  -0.246  4.415  88 
Notes: Tobin’s Q measures firm performance; ROE stands for return on equity, which is an alternative measure for 
performance;  Share denotes the Herfindahl index of ownership shares by institutional shareholders; Vote is an 
alternative Herfindahl index of ownership based on owners voting rights; Levg denotes leverage; Kexp measures capital 
expenditure; Mktrisk stands for market risk measured as the standard deviation of  monthly stock returns for prior sixty 




Table 4. Correlation Data for All Types of Institutional Owners 
 
Variables  Tobin’s 
Q 
ROE Share Vote Levg  Kexp  Mktrisk  Size  Cashf 
Tobin’s Q  1.000              
ROE  0.258  1.000            
Share  -0.129 -0.049 1.000            
Vote  -0.124 -0.040 0.983 1.000          
Levg  -0.281 0.087 0.032 0.029  1.000        
Kexp  -0.171 0.180 -0.041  -0.037  -0.031  1.000      
Mktrisk  0.162 -0.074 0.091 0.122  -0.239  -0.215  1.000     
Size  0.116 0.022 0.133 0.169  0.067  -0.096  -0.086 1.00   
Cashf  -0.245 0.084 -0.029  -0.025  -0.027  0.338  -0.248  0.078  1.000 
Salesg  0.070 0.281  -0.053  -0.056  -0.117  0.028  -0.096  -0.084  -0.065 
Notes: Tobin’s Q measures firm performance; ROE stands for return on equity, which is an alternative measure for 
performance;  Share denotes the Herfindahl index of ownership shares by institutional shareholders; Vote is an 
alternative Herfindahl index of ownership based on owners voting rights; Levg denotes leverage; Kexp measures capital 
expenditure; Mktrisk stands for market risk measured as the standard deviation of  monthly stock returns for prior sixty 










  25Table 5. Validity of Instruments 
 
Instruments Hausman’s  Test Relevance Correlation  Overidentification
ROE  -0.007 9.121***  0.258  28.810 
Industry dummies  -0.009 7.087***     
Vote  -1.429 746.849***  0.983  44.170** 
Industry dummies  -3.154 341.925***     
Notes: ‘Hausman’s test’ is reporting the coefficient of the residuals in the second stage regression. Under ‘Relevance’, 
we are reporting the joint significance of the F-test statistics when we regress the endogenous variable on instrument 
and all other exogenous variables. ‘Correlation’ shows simple relationship between the endogenous variable and 
possible instruments. Under ‘Overidentification’, we perform Sargan’s test with the null hypothesis that all instruments 
are orthogonal to the error term. *** denotes 1%, ** denotes 5% and * denotes 10% level of significance. 
 
(Estimation results table (table 6) and robustness check results tables (table 7 and table 8) continue on 


































  26Table 6. 3SLS Results for All Types of Institutional Owners 
 
Variables  M1 M1 M2  M2  M3  M3 





































































































































































0.143 0.014 0.203  0.094  0.203  0.094 
Notes: *** denotes 1%, ** denotes 5% and * denotes 10% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Tobin’s Q measures firm performance; ROE stands for return on equity, which is an alternative measure 
for performance; Share denotes the Herfindahl index of ownership shares by institutional shareholders; Vote is an 
alternative Herfindahl index of ownership based on owners voting rights; Levg denotes leverage; Kexp measures capital 
expenditure; Mktrisk stands for market risk measured as the standard deviation of  monthly stock returns for prior sixty 
months; Size depicts firm size; Cashf denotes cash flow and Salesg shows sales growth. Ites is information technology 
industry dummy; Inds is industrials dummy; Cond is consumer discretionary industry dummy; Stap is consumer staples 
industry dummy; Mate represents materials industry; Heal is healthcare industry dummy; Rest is real estate industry 
dummy; Tele is telecommunication industry dummy and Util is utilities industry dummy. We use ROE as an instrument 
for performance and Vote as an instrument for ownership share. Above results are generated using a combination of 
individual instruments and interactive instruments with other controls, exogenous variables and industry-specific 
dummies.  
 
  27Table 7. 3SLS Results for All Types of Institutional Owners: Robustness Check 
 















































































































































































































































  28Table 7. 3SLS Results for All Types of Institutional Owners: Robustness Check (continued) 
 









































































   







0.115 0.087 0.118  0.168  0.117  0.131 
Notes: *** denotes 1%, ** denotes 5% and * denotes 10% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Tobin’s Q measures firm performance; ROE stands for return on equity, which is an alternative measure 
for performance; Share denotes the Herfindahl index of ownership shares by institutional shareholders; Vote is an 
alternative Herfindahl index of ownership based on owners voting rights; Levg denotes leverage; Kexp measures capital 
expenditure; Mktrisk stands for market risk measured as the standard deviation of  monthly stock returns for prior sixty 
months; Size depicts firm size; Cashf denotes cash flow and Salesg shows sales growth. Ites is information technology 
industry dummy; Inds is industrials dummy; Cond is consumer discretionary industry dummy; Stap is consumer staples 
industry dummy; Mate represents materials industry; Heal is healthcare industry dummy; Rest is real estate industry 
dummy; Tele is telecommunication industry dummy and Util is utilities industry dummy. dum_pr stands for pressure 
sensitive type institutional ownership dummy. Non-interactive terms are denoting effects of the other type of 
institutional ownership. We use ROE as an instrument for performance and Vote as an instrument for ownership share. 
Above results are generated using a combination of individual instruments and interactive instruments with other 














  29Table 8. 3SLS Results for All Types of Institutional Owners: Additional Robustness Check 
 















































































































































































































































  30Table 8. 3SLS Results for All Types of Institutional Owners: Additional Robustness Check 
(continued) 
 









































































   







0.115 0.087 0.136  0.184  0.134  0.147 
Notes: *** denotes 1%, ** denotes 5% and * denotes 10% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Tobin’s Q measures firm performance; ROE stands for return on equity, which is an alternative measure 
for performance; Share denotes the Herfindahl index of ownership shares by institutional shareholders; Vote is an 
alternative Herfindahl index of ownership based on owners voting rights; Levg denotes leverage; Kexp measures capital 
expenditure; Mktrisk stands for market risk measured as the standard deviation of  monthly stock returns for prior sixty 
months; Size depicts firm size; Cashf denotes cash flow and Salesg shows sales growth. Ites is information technology 
industry dummy; Inds is industrials dummy; Cond is consumer discretionary industry dummy; Stap is consumer staples 
industry dummy; Mate represents materials industry; Heal is healthcare industry dummy; Rest is real estate industry 
dummy; Tele is telecommunication industry dummy and Util is utilities industry dummy. Dum_ps stands for pressure 
sensitive type institutional ownership dummy. Non-interactive terms are denoting effects of the other type of 
institutional ownership. We use ROE as an instrument for performance and Vote as an instrument for ownership share. 
Above results are generated using a combination of individual instruments and interactive instruments with other 














  31Appendix 2: Data Details 
 
 Variables, definitions, and sources 
 
Variable   Definition      Sources 
 
Tobin’s Q  Sum of year-end market value of common stock  Thomson Financial   
    and book value of total debt divided by book value   
  of  total  debt. 
 
Herfindahl  Sum of equity stakes held by individual institutional  Firm’s annual reports 
Index    investors firms in the dataset. 
 
_pr    Pressure resistant institutional investors. That is,  Firms’ annual reports 
    institutional investors with only an investment  
    relationship with the firm in which they own equity. 
 
_ps    Pressure sensitive institutional investors. That is,  Firms’ annual reports 
    institutional investors who are likely to have both  
                             an investment and business relations with the firm 
                             in which they have equity stakes. 
 
ROE   Return  on  equity      Thomson  Financial 
 
 
Vote    Herfindahl index of ownership based on the    Firms’ annual reports 
                             proportion of decisive votes with the institutional 
                             investors. 
 
Salesg   Firm’s  5-year  sales  growth     Thomson  financial 
 
 
Cashf    Cash flow divided by total assets      Thomson Financial 
 
Levg    Total debt scaled by total assets      Thomson Financial 
 
Kexp    Capital expenditures scaled by total assets    Thomson Financial 
 
Mktrisk   Standard deviation of monthly stock returns   Helsinki Stock Exchange 
    Over a sixty month period 
 
Ln(Size)  Natural logarithm of total assets      Thompson Financial 
 
Ites    Industry dummy: Information technology    Helsinki Stock Exchange 
 
Inds   Industry  dummy:  industrials    Helsinki  Stock  Exchange 
 
Cond    Industry dummy: consumer discretionary    Helsinki Stock Exchange 
 
Stap    Industry dummy: consumer staples     Helsinki Stock Exchange 
 
(Data details table continues on next page) 
  32Variable   Definition      Sources 
 
Mate   Industry  dummy:  materials   Helsinki  Stock  Exchange 
 
Heal   Industry  dummy:  healthcare    Helsinki  Stock  Exchange 
Rest    Industry dummy: real estate      Helsinki Stock Exchange 
 
Tele    Industry dummy: telecommunication    Helsinki Stock Exchange 
 
Util   Industry  dummy:  utility     Helsinki  Stock  Exchange 
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